





Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties, part-
ners in a business) are characterised by dynamic accumulation:
current agreements aﬀect future bargaining possibilities. We study
such situations by using repeated bargaining games in which two
parties can decide how much to invest and how to share the resid-
ual surplus for their own consumption. We show that there is a
unique (stationary) Markov Perfect Equilibrium characterised by
immediate agreement. Moreover, in equilibrium a relatively more
patient party invests more than his opponent. However, being
more patient can make a player worse oﬀ. In addition, we derive
the conditions under which we obtain the eﬃcient investment
path. Our results are robust to diﬀerent bargaining procedures,
diﬀerent rates of time preferences and elasticities of substitution.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C61, C72, C73, C78
Key words: Bargaining, Investment, Recursive Optimisation, Markov
Perfect Equilibrium.
∗I wish to thank the participants of the 2007 annual conferences of the Royal
Economic Society, the Scottish Economic Society, the Association of the Southern
Economic Theorists and the SGPE workshop at the department of Economics of
Edinburgh University for useful discussions and suggestions. ESRC ﬁnancial support
(grant no. RES-061-23-0084) is gratefully acknowledged. All errors remain mine.
†Corresponding address: University of Glasgow, Department of Economics, Adam
Smith Building, Glasgow, G12 8RT, UK, email address: f.ﬂamini@socsci.gla.ac.uk,
tel: +44 141 3304660, fax: +44 141 3304940
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several bargaining situations in the most diverse contexts can be rep-
resented as bargaining games with dynamic accumulation, that is, bar-
gaining games in which parties can invest part of the surplus and the
invested surplus aﬀects the size of future surpluses. For instance, part-
ners in a business need to negotiate not only on how to split proﬁts
among themselves at the end of each accounting year, but also on how
much proﬁt should be re-invested for the following production period.
External relationships between a business and its suppliers can also be
characterised by dynamic accumulation: a supplier may agree to make
ongoing investments in new production techniques to meet the speciﬁc
product needs of his customer and the extent to which such investment
takes place will be aﬀected by ongoing price and quality negotiations
between the two parties.
Bargaining games which allow parties to make both investment and
consumption decisions for a sequential number of times are almost unex-
plored (for a discussion of the related literature see below). We develop
a model where two risk-averse players attempt to agree on how to share
a surplus between consumption and investment and on how to split the
residual surplus among themselves. The level of investment aﬀects the
future capital stock and consequently, the surplus available in the follow-
ing bargaining stage. The problem is complex. Not only do parties need
to solve a (potentially protracted) bargaining stage, but also a dynamic
accumulation problem since the agreement they reach at a speciﬁcs t a g e
aﬀects future bargaining possibilities. To address this problem, we focus
on linear strategies (we will then show that this is a weak restriction).
The most important results are, ﬁr s to fa l l ,t h a tt h e r ei sau n i q u es t a -
tionary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) characterised by immediate
agreement. The intuition is that, roughly speaking, a player can always
invest the entire surplus to avoid a costly rejection (see section 3 for
more details). Although the equilibrium is unique, there are three types
of outcomes that can arise. First, when players are suﬃciently impatient
(or, alternatively, frictions in the bargaining process are relevant), both
parties invest little on future bargaining possibilities, and extract all the
residual surplus. Second, when parties are suﬃciently asymmetric, such
extreme consumption paths, where one party can extracts all the surplus
not invested, can be obtained and the relatively impatient party makes
the concessions. Third, there is an MPE in which both parties are able
to consume a positive share of the current surplus even when they are
responders.
An interesting result related to the third MPE (typical when parties
are both fairly symmetric and patient), is that the investment plan is
2ineﬃcient: as in the standard hold-up problem (described below), par-
ties underinvest. Only at the limit, when the frictions in the bargaining
stage tend to zero (or alternatively, parties are inﬁnitely patient), does
the investment path tend to the socially optimal level. Moreover, play-
ers invest more if more patient. However, patience can make a player
worse oﬀ, in contrast to one of the lessons oﬀered by classical bargaining
theory.1 In our dynamic set-up, this implies that bargaining parties can
obtain a more proﬁtable outcome if less established and more prone to
dissolution.
Our results are based on a standard alternating-oﬀer bargaining pro-
cedure. To make our analysis robust we modify the bargaining process
by allowing for a random-proposer procedure. Therefore, after a rejec-
tion a player can invest again with a positive probability. We show that
our results are robust. A more patient party invests more in the long-run
relationship. Moreover, patience can make a player worse oﬀ. In terms
of eﬃciency, again players that are both symmetric and inﬁnitely patient
can invest the socially optimal level of surplus.
A novel result speciﬁc to the random-proposer procedure is that when
the more patient party is less likely to make a proposal, he reduces the
resources invested in the long-term relationship. It is intuitive that when
a party cannot control the relevant terms of the negotiations (i.e., mak-
ing a proposal) he will reduce the resources devoted to the relationship.
Interestingly, the opponent counteracts this trend (by increasing his in-
vestment).
Since we restrict our analysis to linear strategies, we provide a justiﬁ-
cation of this by investigating an asymptotic game in which the number
of bargaining stages is ﬁnite but tends to inﬁnity. We solve the game
numerically and we show that in this asymptotic game, the strategies
are linear and coincide with the ones we obtain when the game has an
inﬁnite number of rounds.
There are two main strands of literature, namely, on the hold-up
problem and on the tragedy of the commons, which are related to the
problem considered in this paper, however, there are fundamental dif-
ferences between these models and our dynamic bargaining game with
investment. In the hold-up problem, parties have the ability to make
sunk investments that aﬀect the size of a surplus, before bargaining over
the division of such a surplus. Since the investor, who bears all the costs
of the investment, cannot appropriate all the beneﬁts, the resulting in-
vestment is lower than the eﬃcient level. Typically, only one party is
involved in the investment problem, moreover, the investment is once
1Also Sorger (2006) and Houba et al. (2000) obtained this result in their frame-
works (discussed below).
3and for all (see, for instance, Gibbons 1992, Muthoo 1998, Gul 2001).2
Diﬀerently, the focus of this paper is on parties who jointly and repeat-
edly need to agree on how much to invest and consume.
The second strand of literature, on the tragedy of the commons, con-
siders diﬀerent parties who can extract part of a surplus for their own
consumption and the remaining surplus will aﬀect the size available in
the next period (see, for instance, Levhari and Mirman, 1980, Dutta and
Sandaram, 1993). The tragedy of the commons consists in the fact that
parties consume more than the eﬃcient level and therefore the surplus
extinguishes quickly (over-exploitation of natural resources is a classic
example). Although, the typical framework analysing the problem of the
tragedy of the commons is a dynamic accumulation game, this does not
include any negotiation: everyone can consume as much as he wishes,
given the stock available. Bargaining has recently been introduced in
these dynamic accumulation games, however, in a simpliﬁed manner
(Houba et al., 2000 and Sorger, 2006). Indeed, in Houba et al. (2000)
parties can potentially bargain forever (á la Rubinstein), but they need
to agree once, since this agreement will be ever-lasting. Sorger (2006) is
c l o s e rt oo u rp a p e r ,s i n c ep a r t i e si ne a c hp e r i o dc a nr e a c ha na g r e e m e n t
over the levels of consumption (Sorger (2006) also allows for endoge-
nous threat points), however, the bargaining process is simpliﬁed since
it is given by the solution of the Nash products. We consider diﬀerent
non-cooperative bargaining procedures, and characterise (analytically
for some cases) the strategic behaviour that arises in equilibrium.
As far as we know the only paper with a focus on a repeated (non-
cooperative) bargaining game with investment decisions in addition to
the standard consumption decisions, is Muthoo (1999). However, the
most important diﬀerence with our paper is that in Muthoo (1999) the
focus is on steady-state stationary subgame perfect equilibria, while ours
is on MPE. This implies that in the former, the investment decisions are
strongly simpliﬁed since parties need to invest as much as it is necessary
so as to have surpluses of the same size. Indeed, Muthoo’s aim is to apply
his inﬁnitely repeated game where parties share an inﬁnite number of
cakes with the same size (Muthoo, 1995). In this sense the problem of
how much parties should invest remains open.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the
model. In section 3 we analyse the MPE. We show that there is a unique
MPE, although, according to the value of the parameters some equilibria
are at the corner (where parties consume all the surplus not invested).
We investigate the solution under a random-proposer procedure in sec-
2An exception is in Che and Sákovics (2004) where parties keep investing until an
agreement has been reached, however, once this is struck, the game ends.
4tion 5. In the following section, we provide a justiﬁcation for the linear
strategies by analysing a game with a ﬁnite number of bargaining stages,
where the number of bargaining stages increases indeﬁnitely. Some ﬁnal
remarks are in section 7. Most of the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a two-player bargaining game in which bargaining and pro-
duction stages alternate (and each stage can start only after the other
has taken place). At the production stage, a surplus is generated accord-
ing to the production function F(kt)=Gkt, where kt is the capital stock
at period t, with t =0 ,1,... and G is the constant gross rate of return.
Production takes place in an interval of time τ. Once the output is gen-
erated, F(kt), the bargaining stage begins and players attempt to divide
F(kt). The bargaining stage is a classic inﬁnitely-repeated alternating-
oﬀer bargaining game (Rubinstein, 1982). A proposal by player i is a
pair (ixt,i It),w h e r eiIt is the investment level proposed by i and ixt is
the share demanded by i over the remaining surplus. The subscript t
indicates the dependence of the proposal (ixt,i It) on capital at time t,
denoted by kt, that is the state variable in the model. If there is an accep-
tance, the bargaining stage ends and the proposer’s current per-period






1−η for η 6=1
ln(ict) for η =1
(1)
where3
ict = ixt(F(kt)− iIt) is the level of consumption. The output
available at the next bargaining stage (at t+1)i sF(kt+1),w h e r ekt+1 is
the capital stock in the next period and it is given by the investment level
iIt and the capital remaining after depreciation, kt+1 = iIt +( 1− λ)kt,
where λ is the depreciation rate (0 <λ≤ 1). Regardless of whether the
proposal at t has been successful the responder at t is the next proposer.
If there is a rejection, after an interval of time ∆, the rejecting player
can make a counter-oﬀer. We assume that the capital stock remains
unchanged.4 In perpetual disagreement, parties consume ict =0 .F o r
the cases of η ≥ 1, we need to impose that players do not receive any
utility during a temporary disagreement but only once an agreement
3Sorger (2006) uses the same per-period utility forms while Muthoo (1995, 1999)
can assume linear per-period utilities, given that the investment problem is strongly
simpliﬁed.
4Alternatively, production takes place again and therefore the capital stock de-
preciates. In this case, the qualitatity results we show in the paper are unaﬀected,
since the equilibrium is characterised by no delays even when the capital stock does
not shrink after a rejection.
5has been reached or, alternatively, when the (perpetual) disagreement
outcome arises.5 Player i’s time preference is represented by his discount
rate hi (with i =1 ,2). Since intervals of time have diﬀerent lengths, we
introduce in our model two distinct discount factors6: the between-cake
discount factor αi = exp(−hiτ) which takes into account that production
takes time and the between-cake discount factor δi = exp(−hi∆) that
takes into account that there is an interval of time between a rejection
and a new proposal. In the ﬁrst period, at t =0 , a bargaining stage
starts and the surplus available is 1, by assumption. The time line in a
speciﬁc example of this game is represented in ﬁgure 1 below.
Figure 1. T i m el i n ef o rag a m ew h e r et h eﬁrst two bargaining stages
are characterised by n rejections (with n ≥ 0)a n di m m e d i a t e
agreement respectively.
The focus is on (stationary) MPE, where the Markov strategies spec-
ify players’ actions for each time period t as a function of the state of
the system at the beginning of that period, kt.M o r e o v e r , t h e a i m o f
our analysis is to deﬁne time-invariant linear rules which describe the
investment and consumption path as a linear function of the state kt. In
other words, the rules are identiﬁed by the share of the surplus invested,
ϕi, and the share of the residual surplus that is consumed by proposer i
(responder j),x i (1 − xi, respectively).
Player i is willing to make an acceptable oﬀer to player j if this is
5The case of η>1 is empirically relevant according to recent macroeconomic
studies (see, for instance, Leith and Malley, 2005 where η is estimated to be 2).
6Muthoo (1995) considers the possibility of an interval of time between diﬀerent
bargaining stages. In Flamini (2007) we study the eﬀects of this complex discounting
structure within the agenda formation problem.
6proﬁtable, that is, Vi(kt) ≥ δiWi(kt) where Vi(kt) is the optimal expected
utility to player i as a proposer, while Wi(kt) is the optimal expected
utility to player i as a responder. Then, the problem for player i can be








[(1 − xi)(G − ϕi)kt]1−η
1 − η
+ αjVi(kt+1) ≥ δjVj(kt) (3)
if the oﬀer is accepted, otherwise
Vi(kt)=δiWi(kt) and Wj(kt)=δjVj(kt) (4)
with kt+1 =
½
(1 − λ + ϕi)kt if there is an acceptance
kt otherwise (5)
with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. Vi(kt) is also called the value function of the
Bellman equation (2). The equation of motion, (5), speciﬁes whether
and how the capital stock is modiﬁed once a proposal is either accepted
or rejected.
Problem (2)-(5) is a recursive constrained problem with a complex
structure since not only does (2) have a recursive form, but the con-
straint (3) embodies another recursive problem (via the value function
Vj(kt)) Although, generally such problems cannot be solved (see Stokey
and Lucas, 1989, Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000), we can characterise the
properties of the equilibrium outcome and we can also obtain an analyti-
cal solution under certain conditions. The crucial assumption is that the
Markov strategies are linear, that is, the surplus invested and consumed
by each player is a linear function of the capital stock. As explained in
the introduction, this assumption is not simply for tractability. In sec-
tion 6, we provide a justiﬁcation for this choice, in particular, we focus
on a game with a ﬁnite number of bargaining stages (which asymptoti-
cally tends to inﬁnity) and we show that in such a game the equilibrium
strategies are linear.
3 Linear MPE Strategies
In this section, we focus on the CES utility. Since in the model the capital
stock is unchanged (or non-increasing) after a rejection, in a stationary
Markov equilibrium delays cannot be sustained. The intuition is that
when the parameter η is smaller than 1, a player can always invest an
appropriate amount of surplus so that a rejection is unproﬁtable to the
responder. For the case of η larger than 1 instead, the stationarity of
the MPE strategies allows us to exclude temporary delays (note that
7temporary delays are not costly in our model for η>1,s e en o t e3 ) .
This is formally proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Delays are not sustainable in a stationary linear MPE.
Proof. In Appendix.
When the equilibrium strategies have a linear form, the value function is
linear as well. Therefore, we write the value function as a linear function
of the state variable with coeﬃcients which are left undetermined, we
then derive the values of the coeﬃcients that make the guess correct.
Since an MPE is characterised by no delays (Lemma 1), then players’












































kt+1 =( 1− λ + ϕi)kt (9)





with bi ∈ (0,1) and η 6=1 /2. The following proposition deﬁnes the ﬁrst
type of MPE, which we call ultimatum-like, since a player can extract
all the surplus not invested as he does typically under an ultimatum
procedure.






























there is a unique MPE in which a proposer consumes all the surplus not
invested (xi =1 ) and invests a share given by








2η−1 − (1 − λ) (12)
for i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j.
8Proof. in Appendix.
In an ultimatum-like MPE a proposer can consume all the surplus
not invested as long as he makes an appropriate proposal over the in-
vestment path (so as to obtain an acceptance). An important feature of
this equilibrium is that patience can make a player worse oﬀ.7 Indeed, if
η<1/2, the share invested by a player decreases when he (or his oppo-
nent) becomes more patient. Moreover, a proposer’s expected payoﬀ is
also lowered by a higher discount factor. Instead, for η in (1/2,1),t h e
investment increases with patience. When a player or his opponent be-
comes more patient, his investment increases. As a result, the expected
payoﬀs of both a proposer and a responder are higher.
It is known that in long-run relationships, when players share an
inﬁnite number of cakes of the same size (see Muthoo, 1995), players
can have extreme forms of bargaining power where proposers consume
all the residual surplus. This is the case when simply ∆ ≥ τ (see Muthoo
1995, p. 594). In our framework where parties can make decisions over
the investment level, an ultimatum-like MPE can be sustained when8
δj ≤ αj (lbi)
1−η
i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j. Therefore, the ultimatum-like MPE can hold not
only when the production stage is relatively quick in comparison to the
length of a round (∆ ≥ τ) but also in the more interesting case in which
this is not true (αi ≤ δi, for any i) as long as the investment is suﬃciently
large, that is, lbi ≥ (δj/αj)1/(1−η). However, at the limit of the interval
∆ that tends to 0, condition (11) cannot hold for both i,j =1 ,2 with
i 6= j.
Assuming that the between-cake discount factor is lower than the
within-cake discount factor (∆ <τ ), the equilibrium deﬁned in propo-
sition 1 exists only for a given range of values of l (given by (10)). To
give an idea of how relevant this range can be, let’s consider the case of





For instance, if η =0 .3,δ i =0 .9,α i =0 .8, condition (10) implies that
l = G+1−λ is in (1.38,1.46]. When the frictions in the bargaining stage
tend to disappear (δ increases), the relevant interval for the parameters
gets smaller and smaller. And, as already mentioned, at the limit for ∆
that tends to 0, proposition 1 does not hold.
7This is in accordance with the results obtained by Houba et al. (2000) and Sorger
(2006).
8Indeed, this condition, together with bi ∈ (0,1), is equivalent to (10) and (11).
9The next two propositions deﬁne the MPE when proposition 1 does
not hold. In particular, in the next proposition we show that strongly
asymmetric demands can be sustained in equilibrium (only one player
is able to extract all the surplus not invested), while in proposition 3,
both players leave a positive share of consumption to the responder.
Proposition 2 For η<1, assume that the conditions (10) and (11)





































i − αiδil1−η(ψi − 1)1−η


























then the MPE proposals are the following:
















with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.
Proof. in Appendix.
In general, we cannot solve analytically system 13, however, we can
solve it numerically and we found that the solution is unique when it
10exists. Moreover, the MPE in which player i is able to behave as in an






see (14). This implies that such MPE are more common when player i
is suﬃciently impatient. Indeed, if both αi and δi tend to 1, the MPE
can still exist but only for δj ≤ αj. For instance, for η =2 /3,α i =0 .8,
δi =0 .9,l=1 .8, there is an MPE for αj =0 .4=δj (where mj =0 .292,
ψi =3 .675; ψj =2 .252). However, if the within-cake discount factor δj
increases (say to 0.45), then such an MPE does not exist. Generally, a
change in the within-cake discount factor δj may aﬀect the inequality
(14), however, if this still holds, a change in δj will not aﬀect players’
strategies (the system 13 does not depend on δj, the within-cake discount
factor of the weaker player). Indeed, player i will still be able to obtain
as h a r exi equal to 1, while player j0s proposal is such that player i is
indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting it.
The most aggressive player (i) not only consumes all the residual
surplus (after investment), but can also obtain a larger payoﬀ both as
a proposer (using the previous example φi =3 .716 >φ j =1 .114)a n d
as a responder (μi =3 .344 >μ j =0 .488). Some numerical comparative
statics show that in general in the ultimatum-like MPE, patience makes
players better oﬀ (for any η<1). In particular, if αi increases (say, using
the previous example, to 0.85), then all payoﬀs increases (φi =5 .225,
φj = 1.138, μi = 4.703 and μj = 0.512), mainly due to an increase
in player 1’s investment (ψi increases to 4.997). Instead, an increase
in the within-cake discount factor δi increases player i’s power only (in
the sense that his payoﬀs increase) and makes player j worse oﬀ (e.g.,
if δi =0 .95, then φi and μi increase to 4.978 and 4.729, respectively
while φj and μj decrease to 0.966 and 0.435, respectively). Finally, an
increase in αj increases player j’s power only but leaves player i’s payoﬀs
(almost) unaﬀected (e.g., if αj =0 .45, then φj and μj increase to 1.178
and 0.580, respectively while φj and μj are unchanged). Indeed, player
j is able to consume more for a given state kt (xj increases since the
multiplier decreases to 0.274) by investing a higher share.
Next, we assume that the propositions above do not hold, the follow-


























for i =1 ,2.
11Proposition 3 Assume that proposition 1 and 2 do not hold, instead,




















































































with i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j.
Proof. in Appendix.
The properties of the equilibrium can be highlighted in the following
remarks and corollaries.9
Remark 1. The most patient party invests more.
Let’s assume that player 2 is more patient than 1 (for instance, α1 =0 .8,
α2 =0 .85,δ 1 =0 .9 and δ2 =0 .95 with η =1 /4 and l =1 ) , then
player 2 consumes less than player 1 (m2 =0 .789 < 1.095 = m1, see
(20)) but invests more (the gross investment is ri =1+λ + ϕi and
r1 =0 .4766 <r 2 =0 .4787) and his discounted payoﬀs are larger than
his opponent (μ2 =0.851 >μ 1 =0 . 4 8 3 ,φ1 =0.537<φ 2 =0 . 8 9 6 ) .
Remark 2. Patience can make players worse oﬀ.
We ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of a change in players’ between-cake dis-
count factors and show the remark above then we study the eﬀects of
9We obtain unique numerical solutions to the system (18) and (19). when it exists.
12a change in the within-cake discount factors and show that the eﬀect
on payoﬀ is positive (patience makes a player better oﬀ). Let’s assume
that player 2 is the most patient party, for instance, α1 =0 .7,α 2 =0 .8,
δ1 =0 .8 and δ2 =0 .9,w i t hl =1 .1 and η =2 . Since η>1,t h e nt h eo p t i -
mal expected utility of a proposer (responder) is a decreasing function of
the guessed parameters φ (μ). The impatient party obtains less than his
rival (in this example φ1 =1 3 1 .9 > 116.8=φ2 and μ1 =1 0 5 .5 > 105.1=
μ2). However, if player 1 becomes more patient, in particular, α1 in-
creases to 0.72 (note that he is still more impatient than 2), then player
1i sw o r s eo ﬀ (φ1 increases to 176.8 and μ1 increases to 141.5) while
player 2 is better oﬀ (φ2 decreases to 112.3 and μ2 to 101.1).
If the most patient party (player 2 in this example) becomes even
more patient, then not only he is worse oﬀ (his payoﬀs decrease) but his
expected discounted payoﬀs become lower than his rival’s. For instance,
if player 2’s between-cake discount factor increases to α2 =0 .82 (ﬁxing
α1 =0 .7,δ 1 =0 .8 and δ2 =0 .9), then φ1 decreases to 124.37 and μ1
to 99.5, while φ2 increases to 152.1 and μ2 increases to 136.9 (therefore,
φ1 <φ 2 and μ1 <μ 2). T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tw h i l eb o t hp l a y e r s
increase their investment shares, player 2’s consumption decreases while
player 1’s increases (for a given kt). Therefore, patience can make a
player worse oﬀ.
The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew i t h i n - c a k ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ro np l a y -
ers’ payoﬀsi sm o r es t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .I n d e e d ,i ft h ew i t h i n - c a k ed i s c o u n t
factor δi increases, player i is better oﬀ while player j is worse oﬀ.F o r
instance, using the example above (α1 =0 .7,α 2 =0 .8,δ 1 =0 .8 and
δ2 =0 .9,w i t hl =1 .1 and η =2 )if δ2 increases to 0.92, then player
2’s payoﬀsd e c r e a s e( μ2 =8 4 . 5a n dφ2 = 91.8) while player 1’s payoﬀs
increase (μ1 =1 2 0 . 2a n dφ1 = 150.3) and the most patient party obtains
the largest payoﬀs.
Corollary 1. For η =1 /2,h i = h (i.e., δi = δ, αi = α for i =1 ,2),
if α2l<1, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which the each








where the auxiliary variable ψ and the multiplier m are the following:
ψ =
(1 + m2)(1 − δm)2α2l


















Proof. When η =1 /2 and hi = h, it is straightforward to solve system
(18)-(19).
Corollary 2. For h1 = h2, at the limit for ∆ that tends to 0, the










1/η − (1 − λ) (28)
Proof. At the limit for ∆ that tends to 0, (19) implies that the multiplier
is 1, therefore the share consumed x is 1/2. Moreover, from (18) we
obtain that ψ is 2(1 − αl1−η)−1/η. The latter, together with m =1in
(21), implies (28). It can be shown that when players are symmetric,
a social planner, who maximises the sum of players’ discounted payoﬀs,
would set x =1 /2 and ϕ as in (28).
That is, players with the same rate of time preference consume half
of the residual surplus and invest a non-negative amount of surplus if
suﬃciently patient (i.e., α ≥ (1 − λ)1/2/l) otherwise players disinvest as
a social planner would eﬃciently choose to do.10
Remark 3. Bargaining can lead to underinvestment.
Using (25) and (26), we can show that the investment strategy in (24)
is smaller than the investment in (28) when players have some degree
of impatience (i.e., δ<1,w i t hη =1 /2, and α2l<1). Only inﬁnitely
patient players behave eﬃciently.
4 Logarithmic utility
A general result obtained in the previous section is that players with
a CES utility agree on how to share a surplus immediately. Moreover,
when the frictions in bargaining stage get smaller (i.e., ∆ → 0), sym-
metric players invest eﬃciently and split the residual surplus equally. In
this section, we investigate linear MPE without delays for players with
logarithmic utilities, and show that such equilibria are not as pervasive
as for the case of the general CES per-period utilities. These can exist
10This result is in accordance with Lockwood and Thomas (2002), which shows
that the level of cooperation among players tends to the eﬃcient level in the limit as
players become patient, although their framework is quite diﬀerent from ours: players
are symmetric, cannot bargain and cannot reverse their actions (while in our model,
parties are allowed to underinvest, ϕ<0, for instance).
14only under two regimes: either at the steady-state or at the limit for the
interval ∆ that tends to zero. Moreover, as for the CES utility, we obtain
that symmetric players invest eﬃciently in frictionless negotiations.
Suppose that there is a linear MPE with no delays, where player i
demands a share equal to x∗
i and invests a share ϕ∗
i. Let ri =1−λ+ϕi.





























































If such a pair (x∗
i,ϕ ∗




Vi(kt) − mi(δjVj − Wj)
where mi ≥ 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. The ﬁrst order conditions

























i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. Note that in the case of symmetry (hi = h)t h e
share invested becomes
ϕ
∗ = lα− (1 − λ) (31)
The investment plan (31) is consistent with the investment in the ultimatum-
like MPE, (12), for η =1and the socially optimal level (see (28), again
for η =1 ).
15The ﬁrst order condition of Li(kt) with respect to mi, is the constraint





































+(1 − δi)(1 + αi)ln(kt)=0 (32)
for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. This is a system in two unknown variables
mi with i =1 ,2. In general, the constraint is binding, otherwise by
the complementary slackness conditions, mi must be zero (and xi =1 ),
however an oﬀer where a proposer does not leave any current positive
consumption to a responder is always rejected (since the right-hand side
of (32) is negative or Wj(kt) <δ jVj(kt)). This implies that generally
the solution to (32) is a function of the state kt. If the multiplier mi
is time-dependent, then the share consumed x∗
i and invested ϕ∗
i are are
also time-dependent in contradiction with our assumption (the guessed
parameters would also be wrong since are based on the time-invariant
linear rules of the consumption and investment paths). However, under
certain conditions we can obtain an analytical solution to the problem
as shown below.
Proposition 4 There is a steady-state MPE for hi = h, ∆ = τ and
lα =1 , where players invest only to maintain the same capital stock k0










with i =1 ,2. Alternatively, at the limit for ∆ → 0, symmetric players







with i =1 ,2.
Proof. in Appendix.
For the ﬁrst case considered in this proposition, we obtain an MPE
where players invest more and decrease the share x∗
i if they become
more patient (α increases), while for the second case, we obtain that
bargaining can be eﬃcient in a frictionless bargaining game (as in section
3).
165 Random Proposer Procedure
To establish the robustness of our result we relax the assumption of the
alternating-oﬀer bargaining procedure and assume a random-proposer
procedure. That is, both after a rejection and after an acceptance (and
production), there is a positive (constant) probability that a player be-
comes a proposer. Let pi be the probability that player i becomes a
proposer, with i =1 ,2 and p1 =1− p2. We will now show that most
of our qualitative results are robust to this change. First of all, we can
establish the following result.
Remark 4. Delays are not sustainable in a stationary linear MPE.
The proof follow the same argument as the proof of Lemma 1 and it is
therefore omitted. The intuition is that since for the alternating-oﬀer
bargaining procedure the stationary MPE is characterised by immediate
agreement, a fortiori, in an game where there is a positive probabil-
ity that a player will become again the proposer in the next period, a
stationary MPE must be characterised by immediate agreement.
Given the linearity of the MPE strategies, we can assume that the
value function has the same form as the per-period utility function.
















βi =piφi +( 1− pi)μi (36)
μj ≥δjβj (37)
kt+1 =kt(1 − λ + ϕi) (38)
As for the case of the alternating-oﬀer bargaining procedure, ultimatum-
like MPE can be sustainable when parties are suﬃciently impatient
and/or asymmetric (see proposition 1 and 2). However, when players
are suﬃciently patient and symmetric, they do have some bargaining
power in equilibrium, in the following proposition, we focus on the case
where the indiﬀerence conditions are binding. Let ci =1−(1−pi)δi and
Mi =
(















for i =1 ,2.
17Proposition 5 There is a linear MPE characterised by the following











where (ψi,m i) ∈ Mi is the solution to the following system11:
















































j δi − αil1−ηgj
!
with gj =( ψj − 1 − (cimj)
1
η)1−η,i ,j=1 ,2 and i 6= j.
Proof. We omit the proof12 since the argument is as in the proof of
proposition 3.
The proposition shows that the change in the bargaining procedure from
alternating-oﬀer to random-proposer does not change the nature of the
equilibrium (the structure of the MPE proposal is similar). In the fol-
lowing, we ﬁrst highlight some of the similarities with the alternating-
oﬀer procedure and then the properties which are instead typical only
under the random-proposer procedure. As in the previous section we
can show that, a more patient player invests more than his rival (e.g.,
let η =3 /2, α1=0.8, δ1=0.95, α2=0.8, δ2=0.99, p1=1/2, l=1.1, then
r1 =1+λ + ϕ1 =0.922, while r2 =0.926). Moreover, as shown in the
following corollary, we can re-establish the eﬃciency of bargaining.
Corollary 3. For h1 = h2,p i =1 /2, η =1 /2, the MPE strategies are
characterised by the following unique solution:
ψ =
(1 + m2)(1 − δm)2α2l
α2l(1 − δm)2 − (δ − m)2 (44)
11Ap a i r( mi,ψ i)i nM i characterises a real and positive MPE proposal. Moreover
the tranversality condition is satisﬁed. There is a weaker condition for the tranver-




j ) < 1, where ri is the gross investment
(1 + λ + ϕi), with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.





(2 − δ)(δ − α2l − δ(1 − δ))
(45)
with
∆ =4 [ ( 1− δ















2 − (1 − λ)
By comparing the multiplier m in the corollary above with the cor-
responding solution under the alternating-oﬀer procedure (see (26)), we
can show that a player is able to extract a larger share under the random-
proposer procedure (cm is smaller than the multiplier in (26)). It is
intuitive that if there is a probability that a proposer will be again in
power and propose again, then he will be able to extract a larger sur-
plus. Finally, an additional feature of the random-proposer procedure is
highlighted in the following remark.
Remark 5. If player i is more impatient than player j, then he invests
less (for a given kt) but if the probability that player i proposes increases
then player j0s level of investment decreases while player i0s increases.
We ﬁrst show this result numerically. Let’s assume that player 2 is
more patient than player 1, for instance, α1 =0 .7,α 2 =0 .8,δ 1 =0 .8
and δ2 =0 .9,w i t hl =1and η =1 /2. If the probability of proposing
increases from p1 =1 /2 to 2/3 then the patient party decreases his gross
investment from a share of r2 = 0.630 to 0.572, while the impatient party
increases his investment from r1 = 0.545 to 0.550. The intuition is that
a more patient player always prefers to invest more than his opponent.
H o w e v e r ,i fh i so p p o n e n ti sm o r el i k e l yt om a k ea no ﬀer, then it is
more likely that the total share of the surplus consumed increases (since
the less impatient player will reduce the share invested as soon as he
c a nm a k ea no ﬀer), and the high investment made by a patient player
is partially lost. For this reason, when the probability of becoming a
proposer increases for the impatient player, the patient player reduces his
investment plan. On the other hand, the impatient player has to increase
the investment level to compensate for the fact that the investment made
by his opponent is not only lower but also less likely. Additionally,
the incentive to make an acceptable oﬀer gives the impatient player an
additional reason to invest more. Therefore, the incentive to increase
current consumption, typical of an impatient player, is mitigated by his
higher probability to propose in such a dynamic set-up.
196 An Asymptotic Case
Often the linearity of the strategies is assumed for tractability (see Houba
et al., 2000 and Sorger, 2006). In this section, we provide an additional
reason to limit the analysis to linear strategies. We show that in an
asymptotic game in which the number of bargaining stages n is ﬁnite,
but tends to inﬁnity, the equilibrium strategies are linear. To simplify the
analysis we assume that η<1, t h ed e p r e c i a t i o nr a t ei sa ti t sm a x i m u m ,
λ =1 , and the gross rate G is 1. Moreover, we assume that players have
t h es a m er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dw ef o c u so ns y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i a .
If n is ﬁnite the game can be solved backwards. Assume ﬁrst that
n =2 . At the last stage, players should invest nothing (or disinvest if the
depreciation rate is less than 1) and divide the surplus as in the classic
Rubinsteinian game (Rubinstein, 1982), with CES utilities. Therefore
at the beginning of the game the problem of a proposer, say i, is given

































































If the acceptance condition is not binding the multiplier λi is zero and














which is increasing in players’ discount factors. Since the focus is on
symmetric solutions, let λi = λ and ϕi = ϕ.U s i n g t h e ﬁrst order
20conditions, the immediate agreement conditions,
Ã








































η ≥ δ cannot be satisﬁed, otherwise the right-
hand side of (50) is always positive and therefore by the principle of
complementary slackness, the multiplier λ must be zero and clearly this
is in contradiction with (−λ)
1−η
η ≥ δ>0. For (−λ)
1−η

















Remark 6. The investment and consumption levels in equilibrium are
a linear function of the capital stock.
Proof. The ﬁrst order conditions, (47) and (48), and the indiﬀerence
condition, (51), imply that the multiplier, the consumption and invest-
ment shares are independent of the capital stock. By iteration, this can
be proved also for n>2 (see (58) below).
In the next proposition we derive an algorithm to solve the iteration
process when the number of bargaining stages tends to inﬁnity. To
obtain a simple analytical solution for the multiplier, we will focus on
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hη =1 /2.
Proposition 6 When the number of bargaining rounds is n (with n ≥






































ns (d(n−1)s − c(n−1)s)=0 (58)
with

















Moreover, for η =1 /2, at the limit of ∆ that tends to zero, players invest
and consume eﬃciently.
Proof. in Appendix.
In the ﬁn i t e - h o r i z o ng a m e ,w ed i dn o ti m p o s et h a tt h es h a r ei n -
vested and consumed are time-invariant, however, when we consider the
limit for n that tends to inﬁnity we obtain a unique solution x and ϕ.
M o r e o v e r ,s u c hs o l u t i o nc o i n c i d ew ith the MPE shares obtained in the
previous section.
7F i n a l R e m a r k s
We showed that in a dynamic set-up, under an alternating bargaining
procedure there is a unique stationary linear MPE. Under certain condi-
tions, proposers have all the bargaining power and consume all the sur-
plus not invested. Interestingly, this type of MPE can also be sustained
in a game with little frictions, as long as there is at least a party who
is suﬃciently impatient. Often in non-cooperative games of bargaining
to simplify parties are assumed to be symmetric, however asymmetries
among players are pervasive in many negotiations and our analysis also
demonstrates that asymmetries matter.
We also established that bargaining can lead to underinvestment.
Only symmetric players who are inﬁnitely patient bargain eﬃciently
(both under random-proposer and alternating-oﬀer bargaining proce-
dures). However, if parties could commit to share all the surplus not
invested equally, then, even if impatient, players with similar rates of
time preference can behave eﬃciently (regardless of the bargaining pro-
cedure adopted). Suppose for instance that before entering a business
two partners could sign a contract that speciﬁes that each will obtain
half of the proﬁts not re-invested. Then, since the players have the same
rate of time preference and consume the same share of the residual sur-
plus, it is intuitive that even if they can make a proposal with diﬀerent
22probabilities, their investment plan is unaﬀected by these probabilities.
An implication of this result for policy makers is therefore to guarantee
an equal division of mutual gains to encourage eﬃcient investment paths
for impatient players.
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 13
The proof ﬁrst focuses on the case in which η<1 a n dt h e no nt h ec a s e
of η>1.
Consider any subgame where player i proposes ﬁrst. Let kt be the state
variable and Vi(kt) (Wj(kt)), the optimal expected discounted utility to
player i (j), with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.
a) The case of η<1. The optimal expected utilities Vi(kt) (Wi(kt))
















if αil1−η < 1. The upper bound has been derived by assuming that the
investment and consumption paths are to maximise player i’p a y o ﬀ as in
a standard growth model with no bargaining. Using the value function
i t e r a t i o nm e t h o di tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h ep e r - p e r i o dc o n s u m p t i o nf o r








and all the surplus not consumed by player i is invested. The condition
αil1−η < 1 must hold to satisfy the transversality condition.
Let’s now focus on the case in which the strategies are linear. Then
if player j accepts a proposal (xi,ϕ i)h eg e t s
[(1 − xi)(G − ϕi)kt)]1−η
1 − η
+ αjVj(kt+1)
while if he rejects it he obtains δjVj(kt). Therefore, the proposal is ac-
cepted if and only if
[(1 − xi)(G − ϕi)kt]1−η
1 − η
≥ δjVj(kt) − αjVj(kt+1) (61)
13The proof generalises the arguments in Muthoo (1995) to the case of dynamic
accumulation and CES per-period utility.
23If the RHS of (61) is non-positive for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j, player i
can consume all the surplus not invested (xi =1 ) without facing a
rejection. Instead, if the RHS of (61) is positive, there are two cases.
A proposer could prefer either to make an acceptable oﬀer or to make
an unacceptable one. In the former, a proposer must ask for a share xi
strictly smaller than 1, although he would be better oﬀ in asking for a
share as large as possible so as to obtain an acceptance. Then, the two
cases can be represented as follows. Either the proposal (xi,ϕ i)i ss u c h
that the following holds





= δjVj(kt) − αjVj(kt+1) (62)






+ αiWi(kt+1) ≥ δiWi(kt)
o rt h ep r o p o s a li ss u c ht h a t





<δ jVj(kt) − αjVj(kt+1) (63)






+ αiWi(kt+1) <δ iWi(kt) (64)
We now show that (62) must hold. Suppose, by contradiction, that
it does not, then there are 2 cases. First, assume that (63) holds for
both players. Then, there is no acceptable oﬀer when the state is kt
(therefore, the state kt+1 is never reached) and Vj(kt)=Vj(kt+1)=
Wi(kt)=Wi(kt+1)=0for any i,j =1 ,2, which lead to a contradiction.
Assume that (63) holds only for one player, without loss of generality,
say 1. Then, player 1 makes an unacceptable oﬀer, that is, (64) holds
for i =1and j =2while player 2 makes an acceptable oﬀer, that














The latter is also equivalent to W1(kt)=δ1V1(kt). Then it must be
W1(kt)=0=V1(kt) and therefore there is a contradiction. In conclu-
sion, for any state kt, ap r o p o s a l( xi,ϕ i)i sp a r to fa nM P Ei fi m m e d i a t e l y
accepted.
24b )T h ec a s eo f η>1. In this case the optimal expected values Vi(kt)
and Wi(kt) assume negative values and are not lower bound. Indeed, in
case of disagreement Vi(kt)=Wi(kt)=−∞ for any i =1 ,2. When the
state variable is kt,p l a y e rj accepts a proposal (xi,ϕ i)i fa n do n l yi f
−
1
(η − 1)[(1 − xi)(G − ϕi)kt]η−1 ≥ δjVj(kt) − αjVj(kt+1) (65)
When the RHS of this inequality is negative (δjVj(kt) <α jVj(kt+1)),
there are two cases: either player i prefers to make an acceptable oﬀer
or not. This is as for the case of η<1 (and a positive RHS) and since
the proof follows a similar argument we omit it (the only diﬀerences are
that Wi(kt) and Vi(kt) are negative numbers and in case of disagreement
are equal to −∞ rather than 0).
When the RHS of (65) is non-negative, there is no oﬀer (xi,ϕ i) which
player j can accept. Again there are two cases: either this holds for both
players or only for one player. In the former, no oﬀer is ever accepted,
and therefore Vj(kt)=Wj(kt)=−∞ but if player j rejects an oﬀer,
then it must be that Wj(kt) <δ jVj(kt) and therefore a contradiction.
In the latter, without loss of generality, assume that for the state kt,
player 2 could make an acceptable oﬀer (i.e., RHS of (65) is negative for
j =1 ) , while player 1’s oﬀer is rejected (i.e., RHS of (65) is non-negative






[x2(G − ϕ2)kt]η−1 + α2W2(kt+1)
This implies that V1(kt)=W1(kt)=−∞. Then it must be that player
1 accepts x2 =1when the state variable is kt (note that δ1V1(kt) <
α1V1(kt+1)). However, the condition δ1V1(kt)=−∞ <α 1V1(kt+1) im-
plies that a demand of x2 =1c o u l dn o tb ea c c e p t e df o rkt+j for any
j =1 ,2...(because otherwise V1(kt+1)=−∞, leading to a contradic-
tion). The stationarity of the MPE requires that player 2 still demand
x2 =1at kt+j but this must be rejected. Using the arguments above we
can show that there is a contradiction. Indeed, if player 1’s proposal is
still unacceptable then any proposal is always rejected and therefore we
have a contradiction. If player 1’s proposal becomes acceptable, we can
repeat the same arguments as for the case in which only a player can
obtain an acceptable oﬀer, with player i replaced by j (with i,j =1 ,2
and i 6= j). Then, x1 must be equal to 1 but this proposal cannot be
accepted for more than one bargaining stage, therefore a contradiction.
To conclude also for the case of η>1, for any state kt, ap r o p o s a l( xi,ϕ i)
is part of an MPE if immediately accepted.
25P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
We show that each proposer can consume the entire residual surplus and
his investment level will make such oﬀer acceptable to the responder
(indeed, the responder is strictly better oﬀ in accepting rather than
rejecting the oﬀer). The ﬁrst order condition of the Bellman equation
(6) with respect of ϕi implies that
ϕi =
(αiμi)1/ηG − (1 − λ)
(αiμi)1/η +1
(66)
while the ﬁrst order condition with respect to xi implies that the share
demanded should be as high as possible. We now input the ﬁrst order
condition in the Bellman equation (6) and after simplifying we obtain
that φi = ψ
η
il1−η with ψi =1+( αiμi)1/η. The rate of investment (66) can
now be written as ϕi = G − l
ψi. Consequently, the unknown coeﬃcient
related to the responder’s payoﬀ is








since η<1. This and the deﬁnition of ψi,t h a ti s(ψi − 1)η = αiμi,


















with bi ∈ (0,1). This deﬁnes an acceptable oﬀer if the responder is better









that is, αj(lbi)1−η ≥ δj for i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j. The latter, together
with bi ∈ (0,1), implies the conditions set in (10) and (11).
14For η =1 /2 the solution is given by ψi =1for any i. Therefore the ultimatum-
like MPE cannot be sustained since no responder would accept a proposal where
c a p i t a li sf u l l yd i s i n v e s t e da n dn os u r p l u si so ﬀered (i.e., ϕi = −(1 − λ),x i =1 )
26P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The proof consists in constructing a set of strategies in which player i0s
demand is xi =1while player j0s is xj < 1. Then we show under what
conditions these strategies can be sustained as an MPE.
The Bellman equations are given by (6) with xi =1for player i and
with xj < 1 for player j. Therefore, the constraint of the acceptance
condition (7) is not binding for player j (so that xi =1 ) , while it must




Vj(kt) − mj(δiVi − Wi) (67)
where mj is the (non-negative) Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. We focus on
mj > 0, otherwise proposition 1 must hold. The ﬁrst order conditions of
the lagrangian Lj(kt) with respect to xj and ϕj can be written as (16)
and (17) respectively, with




Similarly, the ﬁrst order conditions for the Bellman (6), in which the
constraint is not binding can be written as (16) and (17) where the
multiplier is 0, that is (15), where
ψi =1+( αiμi)
1/η (69)
We input the ﬁrst order conditions in the Lagrangian Lj(kt) and the






































αjφj (ψi − 1)
1−η¢
27Using the ﬁrst order condition of the Lagrangian Lj(kt) with respect to
mj (i.e., μi = δiφi), the system can be re-written as a function of the













j δi − αil1−η
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It must be that μj ≥ δjφj and μz,φ z ≥ 0 with z =1 ,2. Such inequalities
are equivalent to the constraints in the proposition. Moreover, given the
deﬁnition of the auxiliary variables (68) and (69) and the indiﬀerence
condition μi = δiφi, we can derive the system in the proposition. A
solution to the system, (ψi,ψj,m j), satisfying the constraints above,
uniquely deﬁnes the MPE strategies and payoﬀs. The conditions (10)
and (11) cannot hold. Suppose by contradiction that (10) and (11) held,
then proposer j would not optimise by leaving a positive consumption
to player i. He could have consumed all the surplus not invested without
facing any rejection.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3




Vi(kt) − mi(δjVj − Wj) (70)
where mi is the (non-negative) Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, with i,j =1 ,2
and i 6= j. The ﬁrst order condition of (70) with respect of ϕi is as
follows:
ϕi =
(αiμi + miαjφj)1/ηG − (1 + m
1/η
i )(1 − λ)




while the ﬁrst order condition with respect to xi is (20). By the comple-
mentary slackness condition, if the constraint Wj ≥ δjVj is not binding,
the multiplier mi is zero and the share ϕi in (71), coincides with (66).
28The ﬁrst order condition with respect of the multiplier implies Wj =












i as in (68) while the











Using the constraint μj=δjφj, the undetermined coeﬃcients μj,φj can be
written as in (22). This implies that, the indiﬀerence condition μj=δjφj
can be written as in (19), while from the deﬁnition for the auxiliary
variable, that is,




we obtain (18). Therefore, a solution (ψi,m i)t os y s t e m( 1 9 )a n d( 1 8 )
deﬁnes the undetermined coeﬃcients, μi,φi in (22), the share consumed
(20) and invested (21). Moreover, the solution is (ψi,m i) must belong
to Mi to obtain a positive equilibrium (in which the undetermined coef-
ﬁcients are real and positive), additionally, the transversality condition
is satisﬁe d . F i n a l l y ,i tm u s tb et h a tp r o p o s i t i o n1a n d2d on o th o l d ,
otherwise, at least a multiplier mi with i =1 ,2 must be zero.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
First, when lαi =1 , then kt+1 = kt, and the system (32) is only aﬀected
by the initial capital stock k0, which is a constant. Assuming that hi = h,
















This implies that there is a symmetric solution for
m =( k0l(1 − α) − 1)
−1
Therefore, using (29), we obtain (33).
For the second part of the proposition, we consider the limit for ∆
that tends to 0. Then, the indiﬀerence conditions in (32) become
(1 − α)ln(m)=0
29or m =1 , from which we obtain (34).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
To solve (51), let η =1 /2. Then, the multiplier is:
λ = −
δ[(1 + δ
2) − α2(1 − δ)]
(1 + δ
2)+α2(1 − δ)
Moreover, at the limit for ∆ that tends to 0, the multiplier λ tends to -1
and therefore parties share equally the surplus not invested and invest




We add a subscript 2s to ϕ and x to indicate the solution related to the












where c2s is deﬁned in (59). The immediate agreement condition implies
that the expression below must be zero:


















where d2s is deﬁn e di n( 6 0 ) .T h e nt h eﬁrst order condition implies that
xj and Ij have the same structure as in (47) and (48) where the multiplier
now is referred to as λ3s and ϕ3s,a 3s and b3s are as in (53)-(57) with
n =3 .
For η =1 /2 and at the limit for δ that tends to 1 it can be shown that





Similarly, for a game with n bargaining stages (with n ≥ 3) xj and Ij









with ans and b3s as in (54)-(57). Then, the indiﬀerence condition can
be written as in (58). Condition (58) is an equation in one unknown,
30the multiplier λns. A solution to (58) deﬁnes the solution to (xns,ϕ ns).
At this stage we can solve the problem numerically. We obtain that for
η =1 /2 with δ =0 .9, α =0 .8 the share invested is 0.62 and a proposer
obtains a share equal to 0.63.15 When patience increases, for instance,
δ =0 .99 and α =0 .9, the share invested increases to 0.81,a n dap r o p o s e r
obtains a share equal to 0.52.F i n a l l y f o rδ =0 .9999 and α =0 .9, the
share consumed decreases to 0.5 and the share invested increases to 0.81.
Since the social planner would set x =1 /2 and ϕ =( αl)2 − (1 − λ) =
0.81, we can conclude that at the limit for δ → 1, parties invest and
consume eﬃciently.
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